This appendix gives details regarding the construction of the data set and discusses the results of numerous robustness exercises.
#29). Inventories, IV T , is Compustat data item #3. The pro…t variable is equal to income before extraordinary items (item #18), the cash ‡ow variable, CF , is equal to the pro…t variable plus depreciation and amortization (item #14), the retained earnings variable, RE, is the change in the balance-sheet item for accumulated retained earnings (item #36), and dividends are de…ned as dividends per share by ex-date (item #26) multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding (item #25). Tobin's Q equals the sum of common shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the close of the …rm's …scal year (199) , liquidating value of preferred stock (item #10) plus dividends on preferred stock (item #19), and liabilities normalized by total assets.
For …rms with a …scal year ending in the beginning of the year, i.e., in the months January through May, we shift the observation to align it better with the observation for the macroeconomic variables. A year t observation for a …rm with a …scal year ending in May corresponds to the period from June of year t 1 to May of year t. This observation enters our sample in year t 1. The same change in date is used for …rms with a …scal year ending in the months January through April.
Output and de ‡ator. The PPI is the producer price index for industrial commodities from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Real GDP is real gross domestic product of the corporate sector, chained 2000 billions of dollars, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
B Additional results for correlation coe¢ cients
In this Appendix, we document that the results reported in the main text are robust to numerous changes. First we graphically document the correlations when cumulative instead of non-overlapping …rm groups are used. Next we look at the results when (i) an alternative scaling's variable is used, (ii) a longer sample is used, (iii) total instead of corporate GDP is used, (iv) the …rm groups are constructed using actual percentiles instead of acyclical boundaries, and (v) …rm group investment is used instead of GDP as the measure of real activity. We also report results for some additional debt measures and results for the comovement between debt and equity. the full sample, there is a further gradual shift, but by now the shifts have changed the series so much that the cyclicality of debt issuance series of the full sample di¤ers in some key aspects with the cyclicality of the other groups. This is especially true relative to the [0,25%] group, but even relative to the [0,90%] group. In particular, note that the cyclical component of net debt issuance for the full sample increases during the recession of the eighties, whereas the cyclical component decreases for the other four …rm groups including the [0,90%] group. Another striking di¤erence is that the cyclical component of aggregate net debt issuance displays only a minor reduction during the other two recessions in the sample; aggregate debt issuance only displays a sizeable decrease when the recession has ended. For the …rm groups that exclude the largest …rms, however, we …nd a sizeable reduction in debt issuance during all recessions.
How does the size dependence documented in the Figure show up in the actual correlation coe¢ cients? The contemporaneous correlation between cyclical net debt issuance and cyclical GDP is still signi…cantly positive for the full sample, namely 0.46. 4 Just excluding the top 5%, however, increases this correlation to 0.69. Moreover, the correlation between net debt issuance and next period's GDP is negative (but insigni…cant) for the full sample and signi…cantly positive for the [0,95%] frim group. In particular, just excluding the top 1% increases this correlation from -0.07 to 0.18. Figure B2 that plots the results for net equity issuance. Starting with the [0,25%] …rm group we see that the cyclicality of equity issuance decreases as larger …rms are added to the sample. As in Figure B1 for net debt issuance, there are some interesting changes when the top decile is added to the [0,90%] group. Whereas equity issuance is relatively ‡at throughout the …rst half of the eighties for the [0,90%] …rm group, the cyclical component of equity issuance of the full sample actually increases during the recession of the early eighties and continues to rise after the recession even though the cyclical component of GDP remains low. Whereas the cyclical component of equity issuance of the [0,90%] …rm group reaches a minimum during the recession of the early nineties and remains at that level after the recession when the cyclical component of GDP further declines, equity issuance of the full sample actually starts a recovery during the recession.
Now consider
As documented in the main text, the actual correlation coe¢ cients are also di¤erent.
Whereas the contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cient between net equity issuance and GDP is small and insigni…cant for the full sample, namely 0.17, this correlation coe¢ cient increases to a signi…cant 0.35 when just the top 1% is excluded from the sample. 5 Alternative debt measures. In Table 1 , we report the results for the cyclical behavior of debt when newly listed …rms are excluded from the sample. The table documents that the results are virtually identical to the results reported in the main text which are based on the sample in which newly listed …rms are included. In Table 2 , we report results for net and gross long-term debt. Although this is an important debt measure, we report the results in the Appendix instead of the main text because of space constraints and because the results are so similar to those of the broader debt measures that are discussed in the main text. The table makes clear that these two debt measures are strongly procyclical for all …rm groups except possibly the top 1%, which is identical to the set of results for total debt and total liabilities.
Alternative scaling. Tables 3 and 4 report the results when the variables are scaled by a trend value of assets instead of lagged capital. The trend value of assets is calculated by …tting a third-order polynomial to the logarithm of total assets. Table 3 reports the results for equity and corresponds to Table 4 in the main text and   Table 4 reports the results for debt and corresponds to Table 1 in this Appendix. The   5 See Table 2 in the main text. results are virtually identical.
Debt and equity issuance in the longer sample period. Next, we report the results when we also include the seventies. 6 Tables 5 through 8 report the results for equity and   Tables 9 through 12 for debt. The tables report the results for both the level and the ‡ow approach and when recently listed …rms are and are not included in the analysis.
Equity issuance is perhaps slightly less procyclical when the seventies are included, but the overall pattern is very similar to the results reported in the main text, which are based on the sample that starts in 1980. The results for debt are even more similar than those for equity. The remainder of this section uses these results that include the seventies as the benchmark.
Other variables in the longer sample period. Although the results for debt and equity issuance are not a¤ected when the seventies are included, this is not true for all variables. In particular, the cyclicality of pro…ts and retained earnings has changed, especially for …rms in the bottom two quartiles. Table 13 documents the cyclicality for retained earnings, pro…ts, and dividends when the seventies are included.
First focus on pro…ts. As shown in Table 6 in the main text, the contemporaneous correlation between pro…ts and gdp is signi…cantly positive for all …rm groups except the two groups in the bottom 50%. For those there is even evidence of countercyclicality. When the seventies are included, then the two contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cients for the bottom two quartiles turn positive, but are insigni…cant. In Figure B3 , we plot the cyclical component of pro…ts for …rms in the bottom quartile together with the cyclical component of an aggregate pro…t measure from the BEA and the cyclical component of GDP. 7 The …gure makes very clear that pro…ts, including those of small …rms, are very cyclical during the seventies. The …gure also makes clear that the second half of the nineties is important in explaining the di¤erent correlation coe¢ cient for …rms in the bottom quartile. During 6 Here and in the remainder of this section, we scale the variables with the trend value of assets. 7 We use an aggregate pro…t measure from the BEA to make clear that the di¤erent behavior of pro…ts during the second half the nineties is not only found in Compustat pro…t measures. this period the cyclical component of GDP increased, but the cyclical component of pro…ts in the bottom quartile did not. Interestingly, the cyclical component of aggregate pro…ts also did not increase during this economic expansion. The cyclical component of aggregate pro…ts did decrease together with GDP during the subsequent economic downturn. In contrast, pro…ts for …rms in the bottom quartile started to decline earlier, namely when GDP was still high, and in fact this cyclical downturn at the end of the nineties is the largest observed downturn for pro…ts of …rms in the bottom quartile.
For …rms in the bottom quartile, the same type of pattern is observed for retained earnings and dividends. Moreover, the contemporaneous correlation between investment and GDP drops from a signi…cantly positive value of 0.54 when the seventies are included to an insigni…cant value of 0.24 when they are not.
Results when total instead of corporate GDP is used. Tables 15 through 18 report the results when we replace corporate GDP by total GDP. Robustness of the results for equity using the level and the ‡ow approach can be assessed by comparing Tables 6   and 8 with Tables 15 and 16 . We see that the results are very similar for the sale of stock and the net change in equity measure, but slightly di¤erent for the net change in equity minus dividends measure and the (problematic) net sale of stock measure. Consider the net change in equity minus dividends measure and the level approach. Looking at the correlation with current and next period's GDP, we …nd that seven of the eight coe¢ cients for …rms in the bottom 90% are signi…cant when corporate GDP is used. When total GDP is used instead, then we …nd that four of these eight coe¢ cients and one of the four coe¢ cients for current GDP is signi…cant. All eight coe¢ cients remain positive. So although the signi…cance levels drop somewhat when a broader real activity measure is used, the overall picture does not change. Tables 10 and 12 with Tables 17 and 18 makes clear that the results are very robust for debt issuance.
A comparison between
Results when actual percentiles are used. The results in the main text are based on an acyclical de…nition of …rm groups. That is, we determine in each period and for each group the lower and upper bound for the value of …rm assets that de…ne the group. Next, we …t a deterministic trend through these lower and upper bounds. When these trend values are used to de…ne …rm groups, then the fraction of …rms in say the second quartile is not exactly 25% anymore. But the variations are small. For the complete sample, i.e., including the seventies, we …nd that the group with the largest changes is the bottom "quartile" for which the fractions vary between 22% and 29%.
Comparing Tables 6, 8 , 10, and 12, which use acyclical …rm group boundaries, with Tables 19, 20 , 21, and 22, which use the true percentiles to de…ne …rm groups, we see that the results for both equity and debt are very similar.
Results when …rm group investment is used. Tables 23 and 24 document the cyclical behavior of equity issuance when the cyclical component of group investment is used instead of the cyclical component of corporate GDP . Tables 25 and 26 are the corresponding tables for debt issuance. By using group investment, we obtain a measure for real activity that is more closely related to the speci…c group. This turns out to be especially insightful for …rms in the top 1% and for the aggregate. When we use HP-…ltered corporate GDP as the business cycle indicator, then we …nd that equity issuance for the top 1% is countercyclical and for the aggregate that the results are very mixed. When we use group investments, however, then we …nd for the top 1% that equity issuance is procyclical for all four measures and for both the level and the ‡ow approach and signi…cantly so in six of the eight cases. 8 Using the level approach, we …nd that all correlation coe¢ cients for the aggregate equity issuance series are signi…cantly positive, except the one based on the problematic net sale of stock measure.
Using group investment also strengthens the conclusion of procyclical debt issuance.
In particular, the contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cients are now signi…cantly positive for all …rm groups including the top 1%. 8 There are some negative correlation coe¢ cients for other …rm groups of large …rms.
Comovement between debt and equity. In Tables 27 and 28 , we document the comovement between the cyclical components of debt and equity issuance using the level and the ‡ow approach, respectively. The following observations can be made. The correlation for the top 1% is always positive and of the eight contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cients, only 1 is insigni…cant. Although the top 1% resembles the smaller …rms in this respect, there remain di¤erences between the smaller and the larger …rms. When we consider the 24 contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cients for the three …rm groups in the bottom 75%, then we …nd that 19 coe¢ cients are signi…cantly positive, three are positive and insigni…cant, and two are negative and insigni…cant. But for the …rm groups with larger …rms we do …nd some negative coe¢ cients that are signi…cant.
C Additional panel regressions
In this section, we document that the results for the panel regressions presented in the main text are robust to several modi…cations. We consider the results when (i ) we use capital instead of assets to scale …rm level variables, (ii ) we use a longer sample, (iii ) we do not winsorize the data, (iv ) we allow for a …rm speci…c trend, and (v ) when recently listed …rms are included in the sample. We also report the results when a …xed time e¤ect is included instead of the business cycle indicator.
Scaling by capital. In the main text, we use …rm assets to scale …rm variables, which makes it easier to interpret the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients. Table 29 reports the results when the …rm variables are scaled by capital instead of assets. It shows that the same pattern of results is found for this alternative choice of the scaling factor.
Longer sample period. Table 30 reports the results for the panel regressions when all available time periods are included, that is, when the sample starts in 1971. Adding these nine years of data changes the results very little, not only qualitatively but often also quantitatively. There is one interesting change. In the regression for retained earnings, the coe¢ cient of cyclical output for …rms in the …rst quartile becomes less negative when the seventies are included. This corresponds with the results for the cyclical behavior of retained earnings characterized by the correlation of HP-…ltered group aggregates discussed in the previous section.
Although the changes are not always substantial, it is interesting to note that the coe¢ cients of cyclical output in the regression equation decrease for all …rm groups when the seventies are included in the sample. For example, for …rms in the bottom (second) quartile the e¤ect of the highest observed change in Y c on equity issuance decreases from 4.0 (3.9) percent of assets to 2.7 (2.6) when the seventies are added to the analysis. That is, equity issuance has become more cyclical over time, especially for …rms in the bottom two quartiles. In contrast, for the bottom (second) quartile the e¤ect on debt issuance increases, namely from 5.4 (7.1) to 8.7 (7.6).
No winsorizing. In our benchmark approach, we winsorize all variables at the bottom and top 1% of their distributions. A comparison of Tables 30 and 31 makes clear that the results are very similar when the data are and when they are not winsorized, except that the signi…cance levels drop. 9 The magnitude of some coe¢ cients changes. In particular, for smaller companies we …nd that the e¤ects of the business cycle indicator on equity issuance, debt issuance, and asset growth are larger when we do not winsorize than when we do. Winsorizing has only a small e¤ect on the coe¢ cients for the larger …rms so that the size dependence also increases when the data are not winsorized.
Firm speci…c trend. To check robustness of the results to the possible presence of …rm speci…c trends, we estimate the panel regressions in …rst di¤erences, but still include …rm speci…c …xed e¤ects. The results are reported in Table 32 . The results are very similar to those reported in Table 30 , which is based on regressions estimated in levels, only the signi…cance levels are lower. One di¤erence is that according to these alternative regressions the size dependence of the e¤ect of the business cycle on investment increases.
Another di¤erence is that the coe¢ cient of cash ‡ows on retained earnings has changed 9 All results in the remainder of this section are based on the sample that includes the seventies. That is, we take the results in Table 30 as the benchmark results. sign and is now negative. This could happen if the …rst-di¤erence speci…cation picks up some mean reversion that occurs at higher frequencies. The lower e¤ect of cash ‡ows on asset growth is also lower for this regression speci…cation. In fact, for …rms in the …rst two quartiles the e¤ect of cash ‡ows on asset growth becomes negative. The benchmark results also indicate that the e¤ect of cash ‡ows on asset growth is smaller for smaller …rms, but the e¤ect is always positive. Note that the e¤ect of cash ‡ows on investments remains positive and signi…cant.
Results when also recently listed …rms are included. included. When we look at the e¤ect of Y c on the change in equity, then we see that including recently listed …rms not only leads to much higher signi…cance levels, but also to higher coe¢ cients. For example, when recently listed …rms are not included then we …nd that an increase of Y c from its lowest to its highest observed value increases equity issuance with 2.7 percentage points. When new …rms are included this coe¢ cient is equal to 10.7, substantially higher. Second, when recently listed …rms are included then retained earnings are countercyclical for each of the two …rm groups in the bottom 50%. Again this is similar to the results with correlation coe¢ cients and is due to a large drop in pro…ts in the second half of the nineties.
Fixed time e¤ect. Finally, we show that the results for the coe¢ cients of cash ‡ows and Tobin's Q are robust to using …xed time e¤ects instead of the cyclical indicator. Figure C1 displays the coe¢ cients for the …ve regressions for both speci…cations. 10 Although there are some di¤erences for …rms in the top 10%, the results are remarkably robust. 1 0 These coe¢ cients are from the speci…cation when lagged capital is used as the scaling variable, but the same results are obtained when assets are used as the scaling variable. Figure D1 documents the relevance of the statement of Baker and Wurgler (2002) that merger activity drive aggregate equity issuance. It plots two series over the sample for which we have merger data, that is, from 1984 to 2005. The net equity issuance series from the ‡ow of funds is plotted using a solid line and the part of this series that is due to retirements of equity of the target …rms in takeovers is plotted using a dotted line.
D Comparison of alternative aggregate data
The picture makes clear that in many periods the magnitude of retirements due to merger activity is the dominating factor in equity issuance. Figure D2 compares the net change in equity and the net sale of stock series from
Compustat with the ‡ow of funds data. To make the series as comparable as possible, we construct the Compustat series for the aggregate change in equity exactly as described in Appendix A, but (i ) do not exclude …rms involved in a major merger and (ii ) do not exclude the …rms involved in the 1988 accounting change. We measure the net change of equity by …rms that existed in period t 1 and still exist in period t, that is equity issuance by continuing …rms. Therefore, to make our series comparable to the ‡ow of funds series, we add retirements due to mergers to the ‡ow of funds data. There remain some other di¤erences that we cannot correct for. In particular, the ‡ow of funds data include closely-held …rms, that is, private companies that are part of the corporate sector.
Although some of these …rms are quite large, e.g. Cargill and Mars, we do not think this can explain the di¤erences documented below. Another di¤erence is that the ‡ow of funds series do not include particular types of equity issuance, such as new equity shares that arise in the conversion of convertible debt into equity and equity share grants that are part of employee compensation packages. Those are included in the Compustat series.
The solid line plots the Compustat net change in equity (excluding retained earnings); the dotted line plots the Compustat net sale of stock measure; and the dashed line plots the ‡ow of funds net equity issuance series with retirements added back in. The Compustat net sale of stock measure is clearly di¤erent from the other two measures and does not even capture the enormous increase in aggregate equity issuance (excluding retirements) and subsequent downturn that the other two series display in the last ten years of the sample.
It is interesting to note that there are substantial di¤erences between our Compustat and the ‡ow of funds series as well. Although they follow a similar pattern, there are di¤erences that are quantitatively quite large.
The Compustat net change in equity and the ‡ow of funds series are remarkably similar up to 1999. After that there are substantial di¤erences between these two series. It would be an interesting question to investigate this further and to determine which fraction of the di¤erence between the two series is due to not including the conversion of convertible debt, equity issues to compensate employees and managers, and possibly the reissues of shares to …nance takeovers. .12 cyclical component: total debt 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 cyclical component: profits 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 Notes: This graph plots the published net equity issuance series from the ‡ow of funds together with that part of this series that is due to the retirements of equity of target …rms in takeovers or mergers. Notes: This graph plots net equity issuance and net sale of stock for continuing …rms constructed using Compustat together with net equity issuance plus retirements due to mergers from the ‡ow of funds. Size classes LT debt issues and Net LT debt issues and LT debt issues and Net LT debt issues and Size classes LT debt issues and in liabilities and Net LT debt issues and in total debt and Size classes LT debt issues and in liabilities and Net LT debt issues and in total debt and Notes: Tables report correlation coe¢ cients; coe¢ cients signi…cant at the 5% level are in bold; the correlation coe¢ cients of assets, inventories and employment are calculated using the level approach and the correlation coe¢ cients of retained earnings, pro…ts, dividends, and investment are calculated using the ‡ow approach; recently listed …rms are excluded; scaled by trend value of assets; '71-'06 instead of the '80-'06 sample. Table 18 : Cyclical behavior of debt issuance - ‡ow approach -total GDP Size classes LT debt issues and in liabilities and Net LT debt issues and in total debt and Table 20 : Cyclical behavior of equity issuance - ‡ow approach -true percentiles Size classes Sale of stock and in equity and Net sale of stock and in equity and sample; …rm groups are constructed using the true percentiles, not the acyclical bounds. Table 21 : Cyclical behavior of debt issuance -level approach -true percentiles
Size classes LT debt issues and in liabilities and Net LT debt issues and in total debt and Table 22 : Cyclical behavior of debt issuance - ‡ow approach -true percentiles Size classes LT debt issues and in liabilities and Net LT debt issues and in total debt and Notes: Tables report correlation coe¢ cients; coe¢ cients signi…cant at the 5% level are in bold; recently listed …rms are included; scaled by trend value of assets; '71-'06 sample; …rm groups are constructed using the true percentiles, not the acyclical bounds. value or when CF A (or Q) increases with 1 ppt; the second number reports the e¤ect in percentage points of a one-standard deviation change in the regressor; the number in the bottom row in italics is the t-statistic; scaled by …rm assets; '71 -'06 sample. value or when CF A (or Q) increases with 1 ppt; the second number reports the e¤ect in percentage points of a one-standard deviation change in the regressor; the number in the bottom row in italics is the t-statistic; scaled by …rm assets; '71 -'06 sample.
